Crowell v. Benson: Judicial Review of Administrative Determinations of Questions of  Constitutional Fact by Dickinson, John
June, 1932
University of Pennsylvania
Law Review
And American Law Register
FOUNDED 1852
Published Monthly, November to June, by the University of Pennsylvania Law School.
Copyright 1932, by the University of Pennsylvania.
VOL. 80 JUNE, 1932 No. 8
CROWELL v. BENSON: JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRA-
TIVE DETERMINATIONS OF QUESTIONS OF
"CONSTITUTIONAL FACT"
By JOHN DIcKINSON t
Crowell v. Benson, decided by the United States Supreme Court, on Feb-
ruary 23, 1932,1 raises anew and in acute form the doctrine of "jurisdic-
tional fact", which from time to time troubles the course of decision on
judicial review of administrative determinations.
I
The case grew out of a proceeding for compensation under the Federal
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act.2 The defendant
had brought the compensation proceeding against the petitioner, alleging
among other things that he had been injured while in the petitioner's employ
and while performing services on the navigable waters of the United States.
The petitioner's answer denied that the relation of employer and employee
existed between himself and the defendant. Under the administrative pro-
cedure provided by the Act there was a hearing and evidence presented before
a deputy commissioner of the Federal Employees' Compensation Commis-
sion, who made a finding that the injury had occurred in the course of
employment and awarded compensation. Thereupon the petitioner brought
the present bill for an injunction in the federal district court under section
21 (b) of the Act, which provides that "if not in accordance with law a
compensation order may be suspended or set aside in whole or in part
through injunction proceedings . . . instituted in the Federal district
'Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School; A.B., 1913, Johns Hop-
kins A. 1., 1915; Ph. D., I919, Princeton University; LL. B., I92i, Harvard University;
author of ADMINISTRATIVE JUST c AND THE SUPRE-MACY OF L.Aw (1927), and of numerous
articles in legal periodicals.
'52 Sup. Ct. 285 (1932).2 Act of March 4, 1927, c. 509, 44 STAT. 1424, 33 U. S. C. A. § 9oi (1928).
(1o55)
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court." The ground of attack on the award was that it was contrary to
law because the applicant was not in fact at the time of the injury in the peti-
tioner's employ and his claim was therefore, as a matter of law, not "within
the jurisdiction" of the deputy commissioner. The fact of employment was
thus made the decisive issue. The district court declined to decide this issue
on the record of the testimony in the administrative proceeding, or even to
consider that record, but held that it must be determined on wholly new evi-
dence presented in court, since the statute would be unconstitutional unless
construed to provide for such a judicial hearind de novo.3 The case having
been heard on the new evidence, the court found, contrary to the administra-
tive finding, that the applicant at the time of the injury was not in fact in the
petitioner's employ and therefore enjoined enforcement of the award.4 This
decree was affirmed first by the Circuit Court of Appeals,5 and now by the
Supreme Court in an elaborate opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Hughes. Mr.
Justice Brandeis filed a persuasive dissenting opinion, in which Mr. Justice
Stone and Mr. Justice Roberts concurred.6
As pointed out in the dissenting opinion, the issue on the appeal turned
on a single question:
"Upon what record shall the district court's review of the order of
the deputy commissioner be based? The courts below held that the
respondent [in the administrative proceeding,-i. e., the petitioner in
the injunction proceeding] was entitled to a trial de novo; that all the
evidence introduced before the deputy commissioner should go for
naught; and that the respondent should have the privilege of presenting
new, and even entirely different, evidence in the district court. Unless
.that holding was correct, the judgment below obviously cannot be
affirmed." 7
The statute itself gives no express light as to the decision of issues of
fact in injunction proceedings under section 21 (b), nor any light as to the
record on which such issues are to be determined.8 The Supreme Court's
decision that the district court was entitled to disregard the testimony taken
in the administrative proceeding on the fact of employment, and not merely
make its own finding but base that finding on entirely new evidence, is put
in the majority opinion on the ground that if the statute were not construed
to require such procedure doubt would be cast on its constitutionality, and a
statute is to be so construed as not to raise such doubt. The decision therefore
turns on whether or not the respondent in a workmen's compensation proceed-
s 33 F. (2d) 137 (S. D. Ala. 1929).
'.38 F. (2d) 3o6 (S. D. Ala. i93o).
r45 F. (2d) 66 (C. C. A. 5th, 1930).
'At the time of the decision the court consisted of only eight justices, Mr. justice Holmes
having resigned and Mr. Justice Cardozo having not yet become a member of the court.7 At 298.
S The section contemplates review, only of the question whether the compensation order
is "in accordance with law".
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ing is entitled as a matter of constitutional right to have the fact of the claim-
ant's employment determined on evidence presented in court in disregard not
merely of the administrative finding but also of the evidence on which the
administrative tribunal acted. The opinion states definitely that he is so
entitled in proceedings under the Longshoremen's Act. Nothing is, of
course, decided as to other fact-issues than that of employment, or as to pro-
ceedings under state workmen's compensation acts as distinguished from the
Federal act. The case, however, raises important questions because of the
possible effect of the Court's reasoning in connection with these broader
issues not controlled by the decision. The reasoning of the majority there-
fore invites analysis.
The basic premise of the opinion is that
"The act has two limitations that are fundamental. It deals exclu-
sively with compensation in respect of disability or death resulting 'from
an injury occurring upon the navigable waters of the United States'
. . . and it applies only when the relation of master and servant
exists." o
The reason why the limitation to injuries occurring on the navigable waters
of the United States is "fundamental" is stated to be because Congress has
no constitutional power to legislate concerning personal injuries except il the
exercise of an expressly granted power, like the commerce power or the
admiralty power. In the Longshoremen's Act, it has limited itself to action
under the admiralty power, which extends only over navigable waters.
The reason for singling out as likewise "fundamental" the limitation
of the Act to cases "where the relation of master and servant exists" is not
so clear. The Court says:
" . .it cannot be maintained that Congress has any general author-
ity to amend the maritime law so as to establish liability without fault
in maritime cases regardless of particular circumstances or relations.
It is unnecessarv to consider what circumstances or relations might
permit the establishment of such a liability by amendment of the mari-
time law, but it is manifest that some suitable selection would be re-
quired. In the present instance Congress has imposed liability without
fault only where the relation of master and servant exists in maritime
employment and, while we hold that Congress could do this, the fact of
that relation is the pivot of the statute and, in the absence of any other
justification, underlies the constitutionality of this enactment. If the
person injured was not an employee of the person sought to be held, or
if the injury did not occur upon the navigable waters of the United
States, there is no ground for assertion that the person against whom
the proceeding was directed could constitutionally be subjected, in the
absence of fault upon his part, to the liability which the statute
creates." 10
9 At 287.1* At 294.
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Apparently the thought of the Court is directed to the "due process"
requirement of the Fifth Amendment. 1 The reasoning in the passage just
quoted seems to rest at least in part on an assumption that while due process
is not violated by the imposition of absolute liability on an employer in favor
of one who stands to him in the relation of an employee, it would be so vio-
lated if absolute liability were imposed in favor of one not in fact standing
in such a relation.'12  The Court thus assumes that the constitutionality of
an application of the statute in any particular case depends on the fact-
question of whether or not in that case the employer-employee relation
actually exists. If it does not exist, then an award of compensation would
violate the constitutional rights of the person against whom the award is
made, since it would impose.'absolute liability in the absence of a condition
necessary to justify it.
On the basis of this assumption the Court goes on to consider how and
by what agency the determination of the "pivotal" fact of employment is to
be made. The position reached is that since the presence or absence of this
fact is something on which the constitutionality, of the application of the
statute depends, and something which is therefore determinative of the con-
stitutional rights of the individual affected, the power to determine the fact
can only be exercised by a court of law applying its independent judgment
to evidence presented directly to it. This would seem to be the meaning of
the following passage from the opinion:
"In relation to these basic facts [i. e., whether the injury occurred
on the navigable waters of the United States and whether the employer-
employee relation exists] the question is not the ordinary one as to the
propriety of provisions for administrative determinations. Nor have
we simply the question of due process in relation to notice and hearing.
It is rather a question of the appropriate maintenance of the Federal
judicial power in requiring the observance of constitutional restrictions.
It is the question whether Congress may substitute for the constitutional
courts, in which the judicial power of the United States is vested, an
administrative agency-in this instance a single deputy commissioner-
for the final determination of the existence of the facts upon which the
enforcement of the constitutional rights of the citizen depend. The
recognition of the utility and convenience of administrative agencies for
the investigation and finding of facts within their proper province, and
the support of their authorized action, does not require the conclusion
and there is no limitation of their use, and that Congress could com-
pletely oust the courts of all determinations of fact by vesting the author-
ity to make them with finality in its instrumentalities or in the executive
department. That would be to sap the judicial power as it exists under
See the fourth point of the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis, at 302.
'The language of the majority opinion does not expressly refer to the Fifth Amend-
ment but to a supposed limitation on the power of Congress to amend the maritime law.
However, as pointed out below, page ioSi, it is difficult to see why Congress is under any
other or greater limitation in amending the maritime law in this respect than that imposed by
the due process clause.
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the Federal Constitution, and to establish a government of bureaucratic
character alien to our system, wherever fundamental rights depend, as
not infrequently they do depend, upon the facts, and finality as to facts
becomes in effect finality in law." 13
II
The- logical cogency of the Court's reasoning is impressive. In sub-
stance, it evolves a new and more rigid doctrine of "constitutional fact"
from reasoning analogous to that which in the past has supported the doc-
trine of "jurisdictional fact". The newer and narrower doctrine is but a
projection of the older one, and can only be assessed against its background.
The "jurisdictional fact" doctrine is that where a statute purports to
confer on an administrative agency a power to make decisions, but is con-
strued as conferring that power only over, or with reference to, certain kinds
of objects, situations or acts, then the fact-question of whether or not in
any given case of such a decision the object, situation or act was, in fact, of
the kind specified in the statute goes to the jurisdiction of the administrative
agency to make the decision at all. It must therefore be determined inde-
pendently in court, even though the determination of the fact in question had
already been made, and was one which necessarily had to be made, by the
administrative agency as an essential step in reaching its decision.14  Thus,
if a statute purports to confer on officials power to kill diseased animals 15
or confiscate "green" hides, 6 and the officials, purporting to act under the
statute, have killed an animal or confiscated hides, on this doctrine the owner
is efititled to try on independent evidence in court the question of whether the
animal was, in fact, diseased, or the hides were, in fact, "green," although
these were precisely the points on which the officials had to reach a determi-
nation as a preliminary to deciding whether or not to kill the animal or con-
fiscate the hides.
This doctrine has the same logical appeal as the constitutional argument
on which Crowell v. Benson rests. It holds that when statutory authority
to decide depends on the actual existence of a fact, then the existence or non-
existence of that fact must be independently decided in court in order to
enable the court to determine whether or not as a matter of law the adminis-
trative decision is ultra vires and void. What the doctrine means in practice
is that unless, on those facts which are held to be "jurisdictional", the admin-
istrative tribunal reaches a finding corresponding to that which a court will
later reach on different evidence, the administrative decision will be over-
"' At 294.
24 DrcKIxso, AmmIISTR.ATIE JUSTICE ANLI THE SUPREMACY OF LW (1927) 309-310;
Dickinson, Adninistrative Law and the Fear of Bureaucracy (1928) 14 A. B. A. J. 515;Dickinson, Judicial Control of Official Discretion (1928) 22 A.. Pot Sc. R v. 293-294.
Miller v. Horton, x52 Mass. 540, 26 N. E. too (i891).
1 Warne v. Varley, 6 D. & E. 443 (1795).
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thrown as in excess of jurisdiction. This consequence raises issues of a prac-
tical kind which are germane on the point of statutory construction.
The practical result of the doctrine of "jurisdictional fact" is to throw
open for complete re-examination in court facts which, if they were not held
to be "jurisdictional". would be concluded either by the decision of the
administrative body or at least by the evidence at its disposal. 17 This doctrine
has an obviously different incidence and value when applied to some types
of administrative decisions and officers from what it has when applied to
others. Thus, where an administrative decision of fact is of a kind reached
by an official simply as a result of a rough-and-ready personal inspection
preliminary to summary action, it does not stand on all fours, so far as con-
cerns the weight to which it is entitled, with a decision made as a result of a
formal administrative hearing protected by procedural safeguards. A deci-
sion of fact made by a dairy or meat inspector as a preliminary to summary
destruction of food is clearly not on the same footing with a decision of the
Interstate Commerce Commission. For the former type of decision the
doctrine of "jurisdictional fact" supplies in some classes of cases a not
unreasonable opportunity for correction; and it is significant that the doctrine
grew up in connection with review of precisely these more or less summary
official acts taken as the result of decisions not based on a formal hearing
preserved in a record."s If a pure-food inspector looks at a side of beef
hanging in a butcher-shop and decides to destroy it, it is perhaps not unfair
to require that he should be able to prove by evidence in court that the meat
was in fact unfit for consumption '; although certainly such a requirement
that-an official must act at his peril has a dangerously discouraging effect
on the force and vigilance of administrative action.2 0  The weight of author-
See FREt;-D, A DIIxISTATIVE POWERS OVER PERSONS AND PROPERTY (1928) 293.
DicxINsox, op. cit. supra note 14, 320 et seq.
" The doctrine made its earliest appearance in Terry v. Huntington, Hardres 480
(I669), where excise officers seized as "strong waters" liquors which the owner claimed to be
-low wines". Cf. Dickinson, Judicial Control of Official Discretion, sulira note 14, at 29!:
"the reason for such a result (i. e. retrial of the facts)t where review takes the form of a
collateral action for damages against the official is largely historical. In the ordinary type
of situation in which such damage suits grew up, the kind of administrative action involved
was not quasi-judicial, nor were the officers supposed to be experts. An officer like a sheriff
held no hearing and made no findings. The finding of facts was therefore necessarily the
task of the jury in the review proceeding, if there was to be a finding of the facts at all. In
consequence a re-examination in court of the facts on which the officials had acted came to
be the rule." Speaking of Hutton v. City of Camden, 39 N. J. L. 122 (1876), which held
that the issue of "nuisance or not" can only be determined in judicial proceedings and without
respect to a prior administrative determination reached after a hearing, a commentator points
out that such a decision is a natural result of "the condition existing prior to the growth of
an administrative procedural law when determination by a court was conceived to be the only
alternative to determination by an officer in any way he saw fit." Note (1931) 80 U. OF PA.
L. RE . 96, at 1o2.
'North American Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U. S. 306, 29 Sup. Ct. ioi (19o8);
Pearson v. Zehr, 138 Ill. 48, 29 N. E. 854 (i89i) ; Lowe v. Conroy, 120 Wis. 151, 97 N. W.
942 (1904).
'See Note (1930 8o U. OF PA. L. REv. 96, at 103, with its suggestion of keeping the
alleged nuisance under quarantine until there is time for a hearing.
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ity in these cases is therefore that the official will be held to have acted law-
fully if he merely acted in good faith and without malice, irrespective of what
the facts actually were. "'
But where administrative action is not thus informal, summary and
based on casual inspection, but consists in a formal decision rendered as the
result of hearing testimony and argument which are preserved in a written
record, the practical case against review of the administrative fact-determina-
tions on new and independent evidence rests on stronger grounds. In such
a case the administrative agency has already found it necessary to decide,
and has decided, the fact-question in a substantially judicial manner, which
accords to the party affected his right to a hearing. It is well settled that
where there is provision for a proper administrative hearing, the individual
affected is not entitled to another and second hearing in the review-pro-
ceeding at law.2 2  Where the administrative proceeding takes the form of a
formal judicial hearing, all needful protection to rights adversely affected
is given by a review-proceeding in the nature of an appeal rather than a
trial de novo.2 "  On an appeal no one claims that the appellate tribunal
should try the facts de novo; it limits itself to considering whether the
tribunal of first instance committed error of law, including the question of
whether it reached conclusions of fact which could not have been reached
on the same evidence by reasonable men. The effect of an appeal is that on
this ground, and this alone, a decision of fact will be reversed.
This is all the protection an individual is ordinarily accorded against
the verdict of a jury or the findings of a master in chancery. Wherever
it is attempted to give him, in the form of a trial de novo, wider protection
against the decision of an administrative tribunal, the practical result is to
undermine the effectiveness of the administrative action. When it is known
that a case can be tried over again on new evidence before another tribunal.
the proceeding in the tribunal of first instance becomes infected with more
than an appearance of futility. This is true irrespective of whether the
tribunal deals with large issues or small. It was true of the Interstate Com-
merce Commission in the days before the Hepburn amendments of 19o6,
when carriers against whom the Commission had, made an order were
entitled to a trial de novo in court of the fact-issues decided by the
Commission. The delays and expense were so intolerable as to defeat com-
-'2 COOLEY, ToRTs (3d ed. 19o6) 797 et seq.; BIsHoP, COMIMNETARIES ON THE NO0-
CONTRACT LAw (1889) §§ 785-790. This result is reached by refusing to hold the facts
jurisdictional. For cases in the administrative exercise of the police power see Raymond v.
Fish, 51 Conn. 8o (1883) ; Forbes v. Board of Health, 28 Fla. 26, 9 So. 862 (I891) ; Seavy
v. Preble, 64 Me. 120 (1874). See also Kennedy v. State Board of Health, 2 Pa. 366 (1845)-;
fetropolitan Board v. Heister, 37 N. Y. 661 (1868) ; Van Wormser v. Maver, 15 Wend. 262
(N. Y. 1836).
=-DICKINSON, op. cit. supra note 14, at io6, n. 3. Note (1931) 80 U. OF PA. L. REv. 96,
at 102-103.
' Dickinson, Administrative Law and the Fear of Bureaucracy, 6oo-6ot; Judicial Con-
trol of Official Discretion, at 290-291, 297-3oo, both supra note 14.
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pletely the purpose of the statute.24  No less intolerable results follow in
the field of minor police regulation, where the stakes are small. Respect
for administrative authority depends on its ability to get its decisions
carried into effect, and carried into effect with reasonable promptness.
Where a party provided with sufficient funds can prolong the procedure by
trial de novo and torpedo the administrative determination by withholding
his most telling evidence until the hearing in court, the result is not merely
to deprive administrative procedure of its supposed advantage of speed,
but to bring the administrative body into disrepute as ineffectual.
An additional result is to clog and encumber the courts with a mass
of new business by requiring them to duplicate fact-finding work the per-
formance of which is the administrative tribunal's reason for existence,
and which, paradoxically, the courts would not be asked to perform if the
administrative tribunal did not exist. A principal reason for the introduc-
tion of administrative procedure and the establishment of administrative
tribunals with quasi-judicial power has been to make possible new types
of supposedly desirable governmental activity which could not be carried on
at all if the burden had to be borne by the already overcrowded courts. In
view of the volume of this added business, the courts, to the extent that
they are called on to retry on new evidence fact-issues previously decided by
administrative tribunals, will inevitably have their dockets so clogged as
to impede the performance not merely of the additional business, but of
their own proper business of handling private litigation as well. This is
particularly true in such a field as compensation awards under Workmen's
Compensation Acts. Each year there are approximately 3o,ooo proceedings
of this kind disposed of by administrative tribunals under the Longshore-
men's Act alone. 25  In a single state like New York the number of claims
filed under the state statute runs to half a million annually. 26 The prin-
cipal object of the Workmen's Compensation system is to ensure through
'"The average duration of cases appealed was not less than four years. Sometimes
they extended over twice that period. . . . The Georgia Railroad Commission cases were
not settled for nine years. Nor did the tedious process end here. After the judicial review
the entire question had to be remanded to the Commission for a new order in conformity
with the findings of the court. After nine years of litigation in the Chattanooga case, back
it went to the Commission to be retried. . . . Is it any wonder that the number of formal
proceedings instituted by shippers dwindled steadily year by year? In i9oi only nineteen
petitions were filed..... A second unsatisfactory feature of the relations of the Com-
mission to the courts lay in the refusal of the latter to accept the evidence taken before the
Commission in the original proceeding as final. . . . This of course involved a duplication
of all expenses, which, in cases sufficiently important to appeal, were very heavy. . . .
Both shipper and railroad therefore commonly came to regard the proceedings before the
Commission as merely a necessary formality to be observed prior to the adjudication of the
matter by the courts. This placed the Commission in a most awkward predicament. It was
compelled to render a decision upon an entirely imperfect presentation of facts." RIPLEY,
RAILROADS; RATES AND REGULATION (2d ed.) 460-462.
" Dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis in Crowell v. Benson, at 309, 62 n.
Message of the Governor of the State of New York Transinittinq Report of Commis-
sioner Lindsay Rogers, appointed to examne and investigate the Administration of the Dc-
partmeit of Labor, STATE OF NEW YORK, LEGISLATIVE DOCUMENT (1929) NO. 49, P. 14.
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administrative procedure celerity of decision in a type of case where experi-
ence has led to the conclusion that delay and prolonged litigation are fraught
with undesirable social consequences of a serious kind. It is, of course,
possible to argue that the application of administrative rather than court
procedure to the decision of cases of this character is, on an ultimate balanc-
ing of the issues, unsound, and violative of the rights of the employer.
If this view is taken, however, the proper course would clearly be the aban-
donment of the administrative procedure altogether and a return to the old
method of personal injury litigation in the courts, rather than wasteful
duplication of effort by administrative agencies and courts alike.
III
The considerations so far advanced relate to the general policy of
the retrial in court of fact-issues previously decided by administrative tri-
bunals. No distinction has been made in what has been said between differ-
ent kinds of facts. It may therefore be urged that while the arguments
advanced are admittedly applicable against retrial of fact-issues in gvneral,
they do not meet specifically the problem of the special class of facts which
are distinguished from others by being "jurisdictional". There is thus
raised the question of what essential difference, if any, exists between
"jurisdictional" facts and other facts.
It may be said at the outset that the question of whether or not a
particular fact is to be treated as jurisdictional, or whether the doctrine
of jurisdictional fact is to be applied at all, depends, so far as the issue
we are now considering is concerned, entirely on the provisions of the
statute from which the administrative tribunal derives its power3T If the
legislature desires and intends to make the validity of an administrative
determination turn on whether or not the existence of a particular fact shall
be later proved to the satisfaction of a court, the court must give effect to
the legislative intent and determine for itself in the review proceeding the
existence of the fact. It might well be that in connection with certain types
of summary administrative action, it would be sound policy for the legisla-
ture to set up such a requirement. Whether or not it would be is, however,
solely for the legislature. There can be no doubt that where the legislature
has rejected such a policy, and has expressed in the statute a clear intent to
confer on administrative officials a power not merely to act on subject matter
of a certain kind, but also to decide whether or not the subject matter acted
on is of the kind specified, there is in general no obstacle, constitutional or
otherwise, to prevent the courts from giving effect to such intent.
2 s
' Warne v. Varley, supra note 16. Kansas Home Insurance Co. v. Wilder, 43 Kan. 731,
23 Pac. io6i (i8go).
'Apart from the limitation which may be imposed by the decision in the principal case.
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The cases where difficulty arises are where, as in most instances, the
statute contains no express declaration of legislative intent one way or the
other,-where it does not on its face expressly indicate whether or not a
particular fact or any facts are to be treated as jurisdictional. If in this
situation particular facts are singled out as "jurisdictional", this is due
entirely to the courts themselves, nominally as a result of construing the
statute, but ultimately of course as a result of applying their view of sound
public policy.2 9  '"here a statute is silent in singling out facts as jurisdic-
tional, a construction by the courts in favor of the jurisdictional-fact doctrine
obviously suggests lack of sympathy with the administrative method of
regulating the subject-matter dealt with. Where the courts are free either
to adopt or reject an interpretation making certain facts jurisdictional, there
is no reason to adopt such an interpretation unless consciously or uncon-
sciously they disagree with the arguments against re-examining in court
fact-issues already decided in the administrative proceedings. On the
contrary, if they accept the validity of those arguments, there is nothing
to prevent their holding that the administrative agency is itself empowered
to decide whether or not the facts exist, instead of holding its power of
decision limited to cases where the existence of the facts is proved to the
court's own satisfaction. This was early recognized. In Groevelt v. Bur-
Tc'ell,30 a college of physicians had by their charter authority to punish for
maJpractice, and found the plaintiff guilty and punished him. The plaintiff
claimed that the jurisdiction of the college extended only over physicians
who were in fact unskillful, and that the question of his skill or lack of it
was therefore open to be proved in court. Lord Holt held, however, that the
jurisdiction of the college extended not merely over physicians who were
unskillful in fact, but rather over the question of the skillful or unskillful
administration of physic; and therefore accepted the decision of the college
on the fact of the plaintiff's skill as made within its jurisdiction. "A man
convict by the defendants in pursuance of their jurisdictional authority
cannot traverse the fact of which he is convict." This doctrine has become
settled law as to the statutory authority of justices of the peace. 3 '
' Seaman v. Patten, 2 Caines (N. Y. 18o5) 312, where the court, in refusing to apply the
jurisdictional fact doctrine, based its construction of the statute on grounds of policy: "When
persons in a public capacity act in matters which require skill and experience and in which
men may honestly differ in opinion, it seems cruet not to protect them when they conduct
themselves with integrity, and without abusing their authority or manifesting any symptoms
of malice."
i Ld. Raym. 454 (Eng. i69i), also reported in i Salk. 263, and in 12 Mod. 386.
=Grove v. Van Duyn, 44 N. J. L. 654 (883) ; Cave v. Mountain, i Man. & G. 257
(Eng. 1840). "A magistrate who commits a party in a case where he has not any jurisdic-
tion is liable to an action of trespass; but if the charge be of an offence over which, if the
offence charged be true in fact, the magistrate has jurisdiction, the magistrate's jurisdiction
cannot be made to depend upon the truth or falsehood of the facts, or upon the evidence
being sufficient or insufficient to establish the corpus delicti brought under investigation," 2
SE.wyx, Nisi Paius (7th Am. ed. 1857) 920, citing Cave v. Mountain, supra; Rex v. Bol-
ton, i Q. B. 75.
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The most illuminating cases are those which review administrative
determinations by certiorari. Much of the history of jurisdictional fact is
bound up with the certiorari cases. It was early settled that certiorari would
issue out of the King's Bench to all inferior jurisdictions erected by Parlia-
ment "to see that they keep themselves within their jurisdiction; and if they
exceed it, to restrain them." 33 This jurisdictional theory of review inevi-
tably raised the question of jurisdictional facts, and of how the reviewing
court was to determine their existence or non-existence. The courts did not
hold in the certiorari cases that jurisdictional facts must be proved to their
own satisfaction by independent evidence. They confined themselves to
determining from the record of the proceedings in the inferior tribunal
brought before them by the writ whether the jurisdictional facts had been
sufficiently proved. Thus in an early New York case it was said: "Inferior
magistrates, when required by writ of certiorari to return their proceedings,
must show affirmatively that they had authority to act; and when their
authority and jurisdiction depend upon a fact to be proved before them-
selves, and such fact is disputed, the magistrates initst certify the proqfs in
relation to it for the purpose of enabling the higher court to determine
whether the fact be established." 3' It has come to be held in certiorari
proceedings practically everywhere that the courts in determining the exist-
ence of a jurisdictional fact found by the lower tribunal to exist will limit
themselves to examining the single question of whether or not on the evi-
dence before that tribunal, as shown by the record, the existence of the fact
could have been found by reasonable men. Thus in another New York case
the court said: "May the court on a common law certiorari go beyond the
inquiry whether the inferior tribunal had jurisdiction? . . . To hold that
conclusions of fact upon conflicting evidence and matters of mere detail . ..
and matters which are clearly submitted to the judgment and discretion of
the inferior tribunal, when the evidence presents a case for its exercise, can
be reviewed would . . . produce great inconvenience and embarrassment.
It may be desirable not to multiply cases in which the appellate courts
can be called upon to interfere in matters of small importance, but that
furnishes no reason for denying the power to see that the rules of law are
not violated .... I conclude therefore that this court has power to examine
the case upon the whole of the evidence to see whether as a matter of law
there was any proof which could warrant a conviction of the relator.'"
A classic statement is contained in the opinion in State c." rel. 1ilwaukee
Medical College v. Chittenden -5:
'Rex. v. Inhabitants of Glamorganshire, I Ld. Raym. 480 (Eng. 169I).
People ex rel. Bodine v. Goodwin, 5 N. Y. 568 (1851).
People ex rel. Cook v. Board of Police, 39 N. Y. 5o6 (1868).
127 Wis. 468, 107 N. W. 50o (i9o6).
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"We must take note of a difference between jurisdictional error as
to a court proceeding according to the course of the common law and
such error as to a mere tribunal exercising quasi-judicial authority. In
the former, jurisdiction of the party and subject-matter being established,
the determination cannot be successfully challenged for such error.
though the basic questions of fact rest upon insufficient evidence, or have
no foundation whatever therein. The judgment in such circumstances
may be erroneous, but not reversible upon writ of certiorari for jurisdic-
tional defect. In the latter, a clear violation of law in reaching a result
within the power of the tribunal to reach, proceeding properly, is juris-
dictional error. In the former, the evidence is not reviewable at all. In the
latter, it may be reviewed, but only to the extent of determining whether
there is evidence upon which the tribunal could reasonably and honestly
have reached the conclusion which it did. The evidence cannot be
weighed for the purpose of determining whether the same clearly pre-
ponderates against the decision. It may be looked into only to see
whether there was competent evidence, sufficient in reason, to incline
the mind efficiently to the conclusion reached. In the first, a conclusion
without any credible evidence to support it, or any evidence at all, is
mere judicial error. In the second, want of credible evidence which,
in case of the verdict of a jury would be sufficient upon appeal to require
a reversal, is jurisdictional error-epror committed outside of jurisdic-
tion, instead of in the exercise of jurisdiction, where the writ takes hold.
performing its function of returning the tribunal to its proper sphere
of action."
This rule has come to be generally applied under state workmen's com-
pensation statutes, which usually provide for review of the administrative
determination by certiorari or the analogous "writ of review." Statements
of it are found in Employers' Insurance Corporation v. Industrial Accident
Commission,30 "An award made by the Commission is subject to review
and annullnent where the finding on any jurisdictional fact is without the
support of substantial evidence, and this notwithstanding the provision of
the act that the findings of the Commission on questions of fact shall be
conclusive and final"; and in Western Indemnity Co. v. Pillsbury,37 "The
power of review extends to the inquiry whether a finding of a jurisdictiolal
fact is wholly without the support of any substantial evidence. . . . The
court may, under a writ of certiorari, inquire into the sufficiency of the evi-
dence to sustain findings of the jurisdictional facts underlying the power of
the commission to award compensation."
The certiorari cases thus indicate that even where the doctrine of juris-
dictional fact is accepted, it need not be held to require the courts to deter-
mine for themselves the existence of the jurisdictional fact on evidence
independently presented to them. Instead they reach their determination on
170 Cal. 8oo, 151 Pac. 423 (1926).
37 17o Cal. 686, 151 Pac. 398 (1926).
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the evidence presented before the tribunal whose jurisdiction is in issue. They
limit their review still more narrowly,-not only do they accept the evidence
before the administrative tribunal, they do not undertake to apply their inde-
pendent judgment to determine whether or not on that evidence they would
have reached the same conclusion as the admiihistrative body. They accept
the jurisdictional fact as established if the administrative decision that it did
in fact exist could have been reached by reasonable men on the evidence
presented in the administrative proceeding.
This result is the natural outcome of a class of cases like the certiorari
decisions where the proceeding in the inferior tribunal is preserved in a
record which is available for the reviewing court to inspect for error. It is
not a result which could be reached in cases of summary action where no
administrative record is preserved, and where in consequence review cannot
be had by appellate procedure, but only by way of collateral attack. It is
probably not recognized how much the fact that review took the form of
a collateral damage suit before a jury had to do with building up the doctrine
that jurisdictional facts must be proved by evidence given in court.3 s Where
the review proceeding is not collateral but is substantially appellate, as in
proceedings by certiorari or statutory injunction, the opportunity of the
reviewing court to correct errors of fact by an examination of the record
renders an independent retrial of the facts not merely wasteful but unneces-
sary, whether the facts are jurisdictional or not.
IV
The doctrine of constitutional fact as developed in Crowell v. Benson
applies to constitutional limitations on administrative jurisdiction the same
reasoning which the doctrine of jurisdictional fact applies to statutory limi-
tations. Just as a statute may confine jurisdiction to cases where a certain
fact exists, so the constitution may be construed to limit jurisdiction to the
presence or absence of a fact-situation.
The process by which the limits of constitutional authority have come
to be made more and more to depend on proof of facts has gone forward
so gradually that only recently has it attracted attention.3" It is probably
not too much to say that such a yard-stick of constitutional power would
have been abhorrent to Marshall and his contemporaries. For them author-
ity in a governmental organ existed or did not exist. Its existence depended
on the interpretation placed by the courts on the words of a written instru-
ment in the form of a general rule; and if it existed, it existed to the limit,
irrespective of the mode of its exercise. Questions of constitutional power
See supra note 18.
SBikl, Judicial Determination of Questions of Fact Affecting the Constitutional Valid-
ity of Legislative Action (1924) 38 HARv. L. REv. 6.
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began to depend on facts when the courts in applying certain of the broader
limitations of the constitution commenced to take the position that the test
of the existence of constitutional power might be the reasonableness of its
exercise. 40 Reasonableness depends obviously on the facts; and so courts
began to decide fact-questions in order to determine whether or not this or
that governmental organ has exceeded its constitutional authority.
During the greater part of our constitutional history a question of
constitutionality has been in the normal case a question of the validity of a
statute,-a question as to the constitutional power of a legislative body to
enact a general rule of law in the abstract. Vhere executive or administra-
tive action has been questioned on constitutional grounds it has been usually
because the action has been taken under a statute the constitutionality of
which is challenged. The constitutionality of a statute in the abstract may
depend on fact-issues, as .where the test is one of reasonableness under the
"due process" clause. Thus whether or not a particular exercise of the
police power is constitutional, e. g., a reqfiirement that loaves of bread pub-
licly offered for sale shall be of a certain size and weight, depends on a
multitude of facts as to the art and practice of bread-making, chemistry,
weather conditions, etc.4" Similarly a legislative requirement that motor oil
publicly sold shall conform to certain technical standards prescribed by the
Bureau of Mines depends for its constitutionality on the whole body of facts
essential for forming an intelligent opinion as to the reasonableness of the
conclusions of the Bureau of Mines. 42  \Where facts are thus relevant on the
question of the reasonableness of a statute in the abstract, the courts have
hardh- as yet worked out any consistent or effective technique for bringing
such facts to their knowledge. 4- To a great extent they still rely on judicial
notice, although the practice is apparently increasing of admitting direct
evidence in the trial court on facts bearing on the constitutionality of a statute
sought to be applied in the case.44
Meanwhile the question of dealing with or passing on "constitutional
facts" has emerged in a new phase. The doctrine that the existence of legis-
lative power depends at certain frontiers on the reasonableness of its exer-
cise has led to the doctrine, now well established, that the same statute may
be constitutional or unconstitutional according as it is sought to be applied
in different concrete situations,-in other words that its constitutionality
"'The difference in attitude is illustrated on the one hand by Mfarshall's dictum that "the
power to tax is the power to destroy", and on the other hand Mr. Justice Holmes' statement
that "the power to tax is not the power to destroy while this court sits". 'Mr. Bikl has, how-
ever, pointed out in the article above cited that some of Marshall's most important consti-
tutional decisions rest on ultimate judgments of fact.
"Burns Bakery Co. v. Bryan, 264 U. S. 504, 44 Sup. Ct. 412 (1924).
'Atlantic Refining Co. v. Trumbull, 43 F. (2d) 154 (D. Conn. 1930).
" Bikli, op. cit. supra note 39.
"Such evidence was introduced for example in Atlantic Refining Co. v. Trumbull, supra
note 42. See BikM, op. cit. supra note 39, at 14 et seq.
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will depend on the facts of the case to which it is sought to be applied.45
This doctrine imposes on courts which have to decide the issue of constitu-
tionality a new type of duty in connection with that issue. Here it is not
a matter of reaching fact-conclusions as to a general body of circumstances
which might establish the reasonableness of the statute in the abstract,-
what the court must do as part of deciding the issue of constitutionality is to
reach conclusions on the facts of the actual case at bar.
Perhaps the most conspicuous instance in which the facts of particular
cases provide the test of constitutionality is in the application of the Federal
Employers' Liability Act.4 1  It was held at the outset that the Act can validly
apply only to injuries which occur in the course of interstate commerce 4-
and it is therefore a constitutional question in every case whether the facts
of the plaintiff's employment at the time of the injury amount constitution-
ally to interstate commerce. In order to decide this question it is of course
necessary to determine first what the nature of the employment was,-in
other words to determine the facts as a step toward drawing the conclusion
on which the determination of the constitutional issue depends.
The cases are legion in which the right to recover has turned on whether
the facts of the employment at the time of the injury constituted interstate
commerce or not. In none has the Supreme Court given special attention to
the way in which these questions of constitutional fact are to be proved, or
to the process by which conclusions as to them are to be reached. This
is doubtless because a large majority of such cases take the form of actions
at law brought under the Federal Act in a lower federal or state court. The
facts regarding the nature of the employment at the time of the injury are
introduced in evidence at the trial along with the other pertinent facts
relating to the injury, and this evidence forms the basis of a conclusion
of law by the trial court that the injury did or did not occur in interstate
commerce. Vhen the case comes afterwards on appeal to the Supreme
Court, the latter exercises its independent judgment to draw from the record
a conclusion of the presence or absence of interstate commerce. This is not
necessarily the same thing as determining what the facts themselves are, as
would have to be done, for example, if there was conflicting evidence on
whether the injured employee was working at the time of the injury on a car
then in use in interstate commerce, or, on cars used exclusively in intrastate
commerce. There is ordinarily no clear separation between the function of
This result is reached on the theory that the statute must be construed as providing ex-
pressly for its application to precisely the facts to which it is sought to be applied,-in
other words as taking up into itself the concrete details of the facts of the case. Thus Mr.
Justice Sutherland has said: "The case must be considered as though the statute had in
specific terms provided for liability upon the precise facts recited." Cudahy Co. v. Parra-
more, 263 U. S. 418 at 422, 44 Sup. Ct. 153 (1923).
'Act of April 22, 1908, 35 STA.T. 65, 45 U. S. C. A. 5r (1928). See FRANKFURTER AND
LAN;DrS, THE BusiNF-ss OF THE SUPREME COURT (1927) 206 et seq.
' First Employer's Liability Cases, 207 U. S. 463, 28 Sup. Ct. 141 (i9o8).
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drawing a pure fact-conclusion like this from the evidence and the function of
drawing from the facts once established the conclusion of whether or not the
employment was interstate commerce. This is because there is ordinarily no
separate finding in the lower court on the fact-question as distinct from the
legal conclusion as to the nature of the commerce. Vhen, therefore, a case
comes to the Supreme Court on appeal it has only the record before it and
apparently reaches its own conclusion as to what the facts were as a more or
less unconscious step in the process of deciding whether or not they sum up
into interstate commerce. The distinction has not been pressing since in the
majority of cases there is no controversy as to the facts about the employ-
ment, the sole issue being as to its character as interstate or intrastate com-
merce. However in one case a separate finding on the facts was made
below in the form of a special verdict. The Supreme Court said that if
the evidence was conflicting it could not go behind the findings embodied
in this verdict, but if, on the contrary, the uncontradicted evidence affirma-
tively established facts which amount to interstate commerce then "neither
the special findings nor the general verdict will preclude us from so
holding." 4S In other words on a conflict in the evidence, the-court which
decides the constitutional question will be bound by the conclusions reached
by the triers of fact below if these are pure conclusions of fact, even as to
facts pertinent to constitutionality, but it may examine the evidence to deter-
mine whether there is a conflict.
Occasionally a case turning on whether or not the facts establish employ-
ment in interstate commerce originates as a state workmen's compensation
proceeding, in which the employer claims that the state law does not apply to
him because of the interstate-commerce character of the occupation at the
time of the injury. Here the finding of facts as to the nature of the employ-
ment is made in the first instance by the compensation officials on testimony
presented in the administrative proceeding. The case then goes by certiorari
or statutory appeal to the state courts and from the latter to the United
States Supreme Court. In practically all such cases the Supreme Court has
hitherto been content to accept the findings of fact of the state administrative
body as the basis for its independent conclusion as to whether on the facts
so found the employment was in interstate commerce. Thus in New York
Central R. R. Co. v. Porter,49 the Court simply said "the evidence showed,
and the State WIorkmen's Compensation Commission found" such and
such facts, and went on to draw from these its conclusion as to the nature
of the commerce. Again, speaking of the findings of a compensation board
in another case the Supreme Court said, "the facts as found we may assume
" Baltimore & 0. S. W. R. R. v. Burtch, Adm'x, 263 U. S. 54o at 543, 44 Sup. Ct. I65
(1924).
4249 U. S. 168,39 Sup. Ct. i88 (igg).
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to exist,-facts, however, disassociated from the legal deductions from
them. . . . We are brought therefore to a consideration of the soundness
and determining quality of the legal propositions." 50
Other classes of cases in which the constitutionality of the application
of a statute has been held to turn on the facts of the case to which the statute
is sought to be applied have been evolved from the due process clause. Thus
it has been held that a state workmen's compensation act may not consistently
with the constitutional requirement of due process be applied against an
employer for an injury which did not in fact arise out of the employment.
This apparently means that in every case decided under state workmen's
compensation procedure 51 the employer is entitled to go to the Supreme
Court under the Fourteenth Amendment on the issue of whether or not the
injury in the particular case occurred in fact as a result of the employment.
Here again we have another type of case where the fact-issues are in the first
instance determined by a state administrative body. From the facts so deter-
mined the administrative body draws the conclusion of whether or not the
injury resulted from the employment. On this issue the Supreme Court on
appeal will reach its independent conclusion. 52 In the few cases to date
there has been no dispute as to the facts and the courts have reached their
conclusion on the basis of the findings of the administrative tribunal and on
the record made before it.5 3
Another class of cases in which constitutionality turns on the facts of
each case are those which deal with the validity of "train-stop-orders" made
by state commissions. The courts have held that the validity of such an
order depends on its reasonableness, which in turn depends on whether or
not the station enjoys adequate service apart from the interstate trains or-
dered to stop. 4 In such cases the practice seems to be for the court in pass-
ing on the constitutional issue to reach its independent judgment as to the
adequacy of the service, although in some of the more recent cases where the
action of the commission has been reversed it seems to have been on the
ground that there was no reasonable support in the evidence for the order."i
Of course in cases of this type the facts to which the court applies its inde-
pendent judgment to reach a conclusion of adequate service are the facts
embodied in the testimony before the commission.
' Philadelphia & Reading Ry. v. Di Donato, 256 U. S. 327, 41 Sup. Ct. 516 (192o). See
also Philadelphia & Reading Ry. v. Hancock, 264 Pa. 220, 107 Atl. 735 (1919), rcv'd 253
U. S. 284, 40 Sup. Ct. 512 (i919); Philadelphia & Reading Ry. v. Polk, 256 U. S. 332, 41
Sup. Ct. 618 (i92).
"' At least where the statute is compulsory as distinguished from elective. For the dis-
tinction see Booth-Fisher Co. v. Industrial Comm., 271 W. S. 208, 46 Sup. Ct. 491 (i926).
Cudahy Packing Co. v. Parramore, supra note 45.
'Bountiful Brick Co. v. Industrial Commission, 68 Utah 6oo, 251 Pac. 255 (1926), aff'd
276 U. S. 154,48 Sup. Ct. 221 (1928).
Bikl6, op. cit. supra note 39, at IO, 13 n.
Mississippi Railroad Commission v. Mobile & Ohio R. R., 244 U. S. 388, 37 Sup. Ct.
602 (1917). See DicxiNsoN, op. cit. supra note 14, at 324-325.
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From some points of view the most important of all types of cases in
which constitutionality depends on the facts of the case are the valuation
cases in the field of public-utility regulation. The fact-issue of the fair value
of the property is decisive on the constitutionality of every rate order. In
i92o the Supreme Court held in the Ben Avon case "I that the utility affected
by the order is entitled to have this fact-question decided by the independent
judgment of the court in which the constitutional issue is raised, and that a
finding of value made by a state administrative body as a result of its hear-
ings may not constitutionally be accepted, although within the bounds of
reason on conflicting evidence, as conclusive by the courts. Here, again,
however, the facts to which the independent judgment of the courts is to be
applied to reach their conclusion of constitutional value are the facts in the
record before the administrative tribunal.
The sum and substance of the different groups of cases which make
constitutionality depend on conclusions as to the facts of the particular case
is that courts which are called on to decide the constitutional point must
reach their independent conclusion from the evidence either as to the facts
themselves, or at least as to the intermediate "mixed question of law and
fact", such as whether or not the facts sum up into a conclusion of "inter-
state commerce", or "value", or "adequacy of service", or "employment", on
which constitutionality immediately turns. Not merely does the multiplica-
tiQn of such cases open the door for types of litigation to get into the federal
courts and ultimately to the Supreme Court which could not otherwise find
their way there, but the practical result is that by raising the constitutional
point a litigant is enabled to transfer to the courts the task of reaching their
own conclusions on issues which would otherwise be determined finally by the
findings of the body which heard the evidence, supposing always that those
findings are within the bounds of reason.
V
The doctrine of constitutional fact is the doctrine of jurisdictional fact
in a special form. Constitutionality is a question of power to act, and when
it is held to depend on the presence of a fact, the situation is the same as
when what is called the "jurisdiction" of an administrative body is made to
turn on a fact-issue. The difference is only that in one case the limitation
is deduced from the Constitution and in the other from the statute creating
the body whose power is in issue. It is accordingly of interest to compare
the direction which the law is taking on review of constitutional fact-issues
with that which it has taken on jurisdictional fact.
Prior to Crowell v. Beiison there had not been raised with regard to
constitutional facts the question of whether or not they must be decided on
' Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U. S. 287, 40 Sup. Ct. 527 (1920).
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fresh evidence presented in the court which passes on the constitutional
issue.57 Hitherto, the question has been whether or not the ultimate conclu-
sion as to such facts must be drawn by the independent judgment of the
reviewing court unfettered by a presumption in favor of the conclusion of
the fact-finding body. The affirmative answer to this question, given for the
first time decisively in the Ben Avon case, breaks sharply with the decisions
on jurisdictional fact in the certiorari cases. Although this matter of the
court's independent judgment is not raised in Crowell v. Benson, it is never-
theless the fundamental issue underlying the decision there. Had that point
not been decided as it was in the Ben Avon case, there would have been no
occasion for the special point of Crowell v. Benson to arise. It may there-
fore be suggested that, apart from considerations of policy already stated,
there seems no sufficient reason for a different rule in the certiorari cases
and the Ben Avon case. The mere fact that in one the limitation on power
is established by statute and in the other is deduced from the Constitution
should, if pertinent at all, favor the opposite result. In both instances, a
court is called on to say whether or not a governmental organ has overstepped
the limits of its authority, and to do so must say whether or not a certain
fact existed. In the certiorari cases, the courts take the position that they
will say the fact existed if the administrative body reached the conclusion
that it did and cannot be shown to have acted beyond the bounds of reason
on the evidence before it. In the Ben Avon case, the rule is laid down that
the court must say whether the fact existed in its own opinion. It seems
more difficult to sustain the latter result where the limitation is spun from
vague phraseology of the Constitution than where it is imposed by statute
creating the governmental organ. The constitutional limitation sought to be
enforced is merely the requirement of reasonable action.1 S It would there-
fore seem that one whose rights are affected should be entitled to no more
than that the governmental agency should act within the bounds of reason
and not necessarily as the reviewing court would act on its own view of the
facts. It has always been axiomatic that there is a presumption in favor of
constitutionality. If the presumption holds, governmental action should not
17 Except in so far as the point was involved in the decision of Ng Fong Ho v. White,
259 U. S. 276, 42 Sup. Ct. 492 (1922). See infra note 65.
s It is not necessary to consider what result would be required if a definite and specific
provision of the Constitution expressly limited the action of a certain governmental agency to
the existence of an explicitly stated fact. The cases which we are considering involve at
most a constitutional requirement of reasonable action. What the courts do is to deduce
from the requirement of reasonableness a further requirement that a certain fact should be
present and then build on this the additional requirement that the presence of the fact must
be proved to the satisfaction of the courts. To approach the problem in this way obscures
the consideration pointed out by Mr. Justice Brandeis in his dissenting opinion in Crowell v.
Benson, that "the power of Congress to provide by legislation for liability under certain
circumstances subsumes the power to provide for the determination of the existence of those
circumstances." If Congress may provide for the determination of the existence of facts by
a particular agency, it would seem sufficient to satisfy the requirement of reasonableness if
the determination itself is a reasonable one.
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be unconstitutional unless so unreasonable as to be arbitrary, and the litigant
should be entitled to no more than that the courts should say whether or not
the bounds of reason have been passed. To hold the action unconstitutional
unless based on a finding identical with that which the reviewing court makes
is in effect to reverse the presumption, and to impose on the governmental
organ the burden of proving constitutionality affirmatively. 9  The effect
of this doctrine is spreading to cases where the issue is as to the constitution-
ality of a statute in the abstract, and. as pointed out by Mr. Justice Brandeis
in his dissent in the Burns Bakery case, the Court sometimes seems to take
the position that a statute is unconstitutional unless in conformity with the
Court's own view of legislative policy.
There can be little doubt that the rule of the Ben Avon case rests at
bottom on unconscious acceptance of the particular brand of philosophy some-
times designated as "naive realism". It rests on the assumption that the
e:istence of a fact is something absolute and fixed, and capable of being
apprehended rightly or wrongly, correctly or incorrectly. The legal authority
of the administrative body is consequently regarded as depending on the real
or actual presence of a fact, independently of anyone's correct or incorrect
apprehension of it, or conclusion about it.0  From this point of view, the
reasonableness or lack of reasonableness of the administrative body's con-
clusion makes obviously no difference. It is assumed that the courts in pass-
ing. on the question of power have access, in a way the administrative body
does not have, to the fact itself, and not merely to a conclusion or opinion
about it. Thus the governmental body's finding, which is mere conclusion
or opinion, can be corrected by being checked against the absolute fact found
by the court. This identification of the court's finding with the fact itself
underlies all reasoning which insists that the reviewing court must reach its
own independent conclusion as to jurisdictional facts. The problem takes on
a different aspect if it is once recognized that the court's finding represents
after all only the court's conclusion and is no more identical with the fact
itself than is the administrative finding. On this view we can no longer
hope to check the administrative body's conclusion against the very fact-the
question is simply that of checking one body's conclusion against another's.
If it is thus understood that conclusion is merely being checked against con-
clusion, it should be enough for the reviewing tribunal to pass on whether
the conclusion below was reasonable. A recognition of this underlies the
See the discussion of the Ben Avon case in DicKixsoN. op. cit. supra note 14, at 200
et seq. The cases reviewed in the same work at 176 et seq. indicate that prior to the decision
in the Ben Avon case the Supreme Court was content to accept, and to. hold that the lower
federal courts might accept, conclusions of state administrative bodies, if within the bounds
of reason, on issues going to constitutionality.
' This is noted by Mr. Justice Brandeis in his dissenting opinion in Crowell v. Benson,
where he states that "The power of Congress to provide by legislation for liability under
certain circumstances". . . does not depend upon the absolute existence in reality of any
fact".
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certiorari cases. That it has not been recognized in the "constitutional fact"
cases is, no doubt, due in part to the kind of issues on which some of those
cases turn.
Thus, for example, where the issue is whether the facts sum up into a
conclusion of interstate commerce, the question seems to be one of defining
"interstate commerce", and so wears the appearance of a question of consti-
tutional interpretation for the court, although turning on the facts of each
case. What it is logical to assume of such a question as "interstate com-
merce" has been assumed by analogy of such other conclusions as "reason-
ableness", "value", "adequacy of service", "injuries arising out of the em-
ployment" and the like, which are also treated as questions of constitutional
interpretation, and, therefore, for the exclusive determination of the
court, when forming a link toward an ultimate conclusion of constitution-
ality. Now conclusions of the latter kind are precisely those which,
under the name of "conclusions on mixed questions of law and fact", are
left in ordinary litigation to be drawn from the evidence by the triers of fact
without interference by the reviewing court unless (a) beyond the bounds
of reason on the evidence, or (b) at variance with some general rule which
the court chooses to lay down as one of law.6' If it is well settled, as it is,
that such "mixed" conclusions of the fact-finding body are to stand althqugh
embodying an element of law, it is hard to see why they should not stand
merely because the element of law happens to be constitutional law. If, in
other words, negligence in tort law is left to take its specific content in the
ordinary case from the conclusions of the fact-finding body, it is hard to see
why "adequacy of service" or "injury arising out of the employment" in
constitutional law should not likewise take their content from the same source
so long as within the bounds of reason on the evidence and not at variance
with a legal rule. To require that such conclusions, because they go to con-
stitutionality, must be drawn from the evidence by the courts themselves,
is in effect to make every constitutional case nothing but a jury case with the
court acting as jury. Such a result tends to destroy the value of precedents
and invites every case into court, and ultimately into the Supreme Court, on
its facts. Obviously, however, there is no time for the Supreme Court to de-
cide more than a relatively small proportion of all such cases that may arise,
with the result that its action takes the form of sporadic and uncertain inter-
ference, leaving behind a train of decisions which, being only decisions on
facts, have small value or no value as guides in future cases.62  This is,
however, the result toward which the recent decisions have been tending.
Even assuming, however, that conclusions of fact, or on mixed ques-
tions of law and fact, when going to constitutionality, must be drawn by the
courts, it has hitherto been taken for granted by the Supreme Court in all
1 Dicr~rxsoz, op. cit. supra note 14, at 168-170, 313-319; Bohlen, Jlixed Questions of
Law and Fact (I923) 72 U. OF PA. L. REv. IIi et seq.
= See FR.%NKFURTER AND LANDIS, op. cit. supra note 46, at 206-208.
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
the groups of cases above discussed that such conclusions are to be drawn
from the record made before the body whose determination is under review.
Thus in determining whether a state workmen's compensation award has
been made to a claimant who at the time of the injury was engaged in inter-
state commerce, the Supreme Court has drawn its conclusion as to the nature
of the employment from the testimony before the compensation officials. Sim-
ilarly, in deciding whether or not an injury for which a compensation award
was made arose out of the employment, the Supreme Court has reached its
conclusion on the administrative testimony. Again, in determining whether
or not the value of utility property used as the basis for a rate order was
the constitutional fair value of the property, the Supreme Court has reached
its judgment of fact from the record before the utility commission. There
has never been any suggestion that in order to reach an independent conclu-
sion on questions which go to constitutionality the Supreme Court must have
before it testimony taken in a court of law instead of that taken before the
administrative body.
If the Supreme Court has been thus willing to reach its conclusions on
issues of constitutional fact from an administrative record, it would be incon-
sistent to hold that inferior courts, federal or state, cannot do likewise, and to
require such courts to determine constitutional facts only from an independ-
ent record made in a hearing de novo before them. No such requirement has
ever been imposed. The Supreme Court has accepted without question, and
has itself acted under procedure which allows no opportunity for trial de novo
of constitutional facts and leaves no opening for the courts to determine
those facts except on an administrative record. This has been true in prac-
tically all the types of cases reviewed above. Thus in the workmen's com-
pensation cases which raise the constitutional issue of "interstate commerce"
and "injuries arising out of the employment" the state procedure gave no
opportunity to take other testimony on those issues than that presented before
the board. Similarly, in the train-stop and valuation cases, the state proce-
dure does not ordinarily provide for trial de novo on the facts. Nevertheless,
the Supreme Court has taken jurisdiction of the constitutional issue in these
cases on appeal without raising any question of an improper record. In
Booth-Fisher Company v. Industrial Cominission, ' it was held that a com-
pulsory workmen's compensation act would be unconstitutional if it did not
permit the reviewing court to reach its independent conclusion as to whether
or not the injury was in fact wilfully self-inflicted; but there was no sugges-
tion whatever that the conclusion must be reached on fresh evidence in a trial
de noz'o.
It seems therefore clear on the precedents that even where courts must
reach their independent conclusions on questions of constitutional fact, it has
not hitherto been held that they must do so on the basis of an independent
C27I U. S. 208, 46 Sup. Ct. 49I (1926).
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record made in court. In fact, in the Ju Toy case, 64 there was a square
holding that a person prevented from entering the country by immigration
officials after an administrative hearing was not entitled to a trial de novo
in court of the highly important fact of citizenship on which the constitu-
tional right of the officials to act at all depended.65 Crowell v. Benson now
holds that there must be a court trial de novo on a particular type of con-
stitutional fact in a particular type of proceeding. The important practical
question is whether the decision is to be interpreted as establishing the broad
implications of its reasoning; or, if not, what is the test of the kind of fact
and the kind of proceeding to which the doctrine of the case is limited.
VI
It would be not merely inconvenient and burdensome to the courts, but
altogether disruptive of administrative processes, to hold that every fact-issue
on which a claim of constitutional right can be made to depend becomes
thereby entitled to a retrial on new evidence in a review proceeding at law.
The reason is that under the broad interpretation now placed on the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments there is practically no issue going to the substantial
merits of a controversy which if "unreasonably" decided by an administrative
tribunal cannot be made the basis of a claim of constitutional right. Consider
for example, a proceeding before a utility commission or the Interstate Com-
merce Commission charging discrimination against a carrier. The adminis-
trative body finds that discrimination exists and orders a lowering of the
rate. If there was "in fact" no discrimination, it is quite possible to argue
that there is no reasonable justification for the lowering of the rate and the
resulting "taking" of the utility's property. The basis is thus laid for a
claim of constitutional right the determination of which depends on a con-
clusion as to the existence or non-existence of the fact of discrimination. It
has hitherto been well settled that on review of an administrative finding of
discrimination the utility is not entitled even to the independent judgment
"United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U. S. 253, 25 Sup. Ct. 6.14 (0o5).
However, in Ng Fong Ho v. White, supra note 57, an "expulsion" as distinguished
from an "exclusion" case (see VAN VLECK, ADMINISTRATIVF CONTROL OF AuLE-s (1932)
i89) it was held, that the alien was entitled to court retrial on new evidence of the fact of
citizenship on the ground that it is "an essential jurisdictional fact". There can be no doubt
that the holding in this case paves the way for the decision in Crowell v. Benson. The decision
can of course be put on the ground that Congress did not intend to commit to the immigration
officials the determination of the fact of citizenship. If it is taken as a standing for the
broader proposition that Congress cannot constitutionally commit the determination of that
question to administrative officials, the question then arises as to what questions can, and what
cannot, be constitutionally left to the determination of an administrative tribunal. If citizen-
ship, because of the personal rights depending upon it, cannot constitutionally be left to the
determination of an administrative tribunal, it is plausible to hold that such a question as
constitutional fair value in rate cases, upon which large property interests depend, can in
the same way not be left to their determination. However, if the problem is approached
from the standpoint of this analysis, the ultimate result will be less unsatisfactory than to
hold that all fact issues upon which a constitutional right depends must for that reason be
decided on evidence presented in a law court.
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of the reviewing court on the evidence." It seems plain, however, that in the
manner just described discrimination can, by the skill of the pleader, be con-
verted into a constitutional issue which brings it within the doctrine of
Crowell v. Benson.
Again, suppose an application for a building permit. The financial
interest at stake in such applications is frequently far greater than is ever
involved in a workmen's compensation proceeding. Suppose a perftnit re-
fused because of a finding by the building inspector that the plans submitted
do not sufficiently provide for safety of construction or protection against
fire hazards. The owner can claim with a substantial show of reason that
unless the finding of the inspector is "correct in fact" he is being deprived
of his constitutional rights, thus requiring, if Crowell v. Benson is broadly
applied, that the correctness of the finding shall be re-examined on new evi-
dence in court. The cases are already moving in this direction so far as zon-
ing orders and regulations are concerned, the Supreme Court having held
that the reasonableness of a zoning order on the facts of the case constitutes
a -constitutional question under the Fourteenth Amendment on which the
affected property owner is entitled to the independent conclusion of the
courts. 67  It only remains on the basis thus laid to apply Crowell v. Benson
and require that the court's finding of reasonableness must be drawn from
independent testimony.
In the field of workmen's compensation awards it has already been
decided, as we have seen, that whether or not the injury actually arose out
of the employment in the particular case is a constitutional issue, which, if
wrongly decided against an employer, deprives him of his constitutional
rights. The same holding has been reached as to the issue of whether or
not the injury to the employee was wilfully self-inflicted. If an employer
is entitled, as in Crowell v. Benson, to a court trial de novo of the facts as to
the employer-employee relationship because the question is one of consti-
tutional fact, there seems no reason for denying him the right to a similar
trial on the constitutional facts of whether the injury arose out of the employ-
ment or was wilfully self-inflicted.
"Without multiplying examples it seems clear that substantially all issues
of importance committed to the decision of administrative tribunals and
which affect personal or property rights are thus capable of being translated
into issues of constitutional fact. If the doctrine of Crowell v. Benson applies
to constitutional issues merely because they are such, the result would be to
subject all administrative determinations on points of material substance
which affect l5ersonal and property rights to a retrial on new evidence in the
0' See DicxItisox, op. cit. supra note 14, at 159-174.
. Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U. S. 183, 48 Sup. Ct. 447 (1928). It is to be noted
that in this case the determination of fact was made by the master in a federal equity proceed-
ing on evidence presented directly to him, and not on evidence presented before the adminis-
trative body.
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reviewing court. It is true that the doctrine need not logically be extended
to administrative decisions which affect what are rather special privileges
or favors bestowed by government than "fundamental" private rights. This
would exempt from the operation of the rule, as the majority opinion ex-
pressly points out, the determinations of certain administrative agencies
"which have been created to aid in the performance of governmental func-
tions, and where the mode of determination is within the control of Con-
gress; as e. g., in the proceedings of the Land Office pursuant to provisions
for the disposition of public lands, of the authorities of the Post Office in
relation to postal privileges, of the Bureau of Internal Revenue with respect
to taxes, and of the Labor Department as to the admission and deportation
of aliens." Is It would, however, leave within the scope of the rule all ad-
ministrative agencies whose function is to exercise regulatory authority
under the police power or the power to regulate public callings. The dis-
tinct impression left by the reasoning of the majority is that where determi-
nations of fact made by such agencies are pertinent to a constitutional issue
they must be subject to review on independent evidence in court to make the
procedure constitutional.00
If the holding of the case should be taken to go so far as this it would, of
course, effect nothing short of a revolution not merely in the precedents, but
in the organization and procedure of the whole existing administrative system
of police regulation, state as well as federal. If it is a requirement of due
process that one whose rights have been adversely affected by an administra-
tive determination on a question of constitutional fact must be entitled to a
re-examination of the fact on new evidence in a law-court it would follow
that all state procedure under the police power which does not provide an
opportunity for such re-examination must be unconstitutional under the
Fourteenth Amendment. Logically the reasoning and assumptions of the
majority in Crowell v. Benson point towards this conclusion; but at the same
time there are many expressions in the opinion which indicate that a less
drastic and extensive result seems to be intended.
In the first place the decision is in part expressly rested on the judicial
article of the Federal Constitution and on the doctrine of the separation of
powers. The Court reaches its result partly on the theory that a different
holding would unconstitutionally restrict the judicial power granted by the
Article III to the federal courts through requiring them to reach a conclusion
on a record made before another body. On this view the doctrine of the case
would be limited to review proceedings in the federal courts and would not
be applicable to state procedure at all, so that state statutes would still remain
constitutional which do not provide for court retrial de novo of issues of
constitutional fact. The Court says:
18 At 295.
c At 292.
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"In this aspect of the question the irrelevancy of state statutes and
citations from state courts as to the distribution of state powers is
apparent. A state may distribute its powers as it sees fit, provided only
that it acts consistently with the essential demands of due process and
does not transgress those restrictions of the federal constitution which
are applicable to state authority." -0
The proviso in the words just quoted leaves the door ominously open, how-
ever, to what may be held required of state procedure by "the essential
demands of due process" in the light of the Ben Avon case.
Assuming that the decision is meant to be limited to review proceedings
in the federal courts, the opinion suggests certain further limitations. Thus
it is apparently not meant to apply to review of orders of the Interstate Com-
merce Commission, which seem excepted by the following language:
"We have already noted the inappositeness to the present inquiry
of decisions with respect to determinations of fact upon evidence and
within the authority conferred, made by administrative agencies wvhich
have been created to aid in the performance of governmental functions,
and where the mode of determination is within the control of Congress.
S. .. Similar considerations apply to decisions with respect to deter-
minations of fact by boards and commissions created by Congress to
assist it in its legislative process in governing various transactions sub-
ject to its authority, as for example, the rates and practices of inter-
state carriers, the legislature thus being able to apply its standards to a
host of instances which it is impracticable to consider and legislate upon
directly, and the action being none the less legislative because taken
through a subordinate body." 71
Here again, however, it must be noted that the court expressly limits its
statement to "determinations of fact . within the authority conferred",
which suggests that on an issue of whether or not the order is "within the
authority conferred" the doctrine of Crowell '. Benisoni may well be held
applicable.
Furthermore the majority opinion suggests that in workmen's compen-
sation proceedings the doctrine of the case may be limited to the single fact-
question of the existence of the employer-employee relation. The opinion
expressly states that "finality may be regarded as extending to the adminis-
trative determination of the question of fact whether the injury was occa-
sioned by the wilful intention of the employee to injure or kill himself." 7-2
No reason is suggested, however, why the fact of the employer-employee
relation should be thus dealt with differently than other facts elsewhere held
.'At 295.
1 At 295.
"At 291.
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constitutional, as, for example, the question of whether the injury was wil-
fully self-inflicted has been held to be.7"
Finally and most importantly there runs throughout the opinion a thread
of connection between the result reached and the fact that the case involved
the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts under Article III of the Con-
stitution. Thus in holding that the statute would be unconstitutional if applied
in a case where the employer-employee relation did not in fact exist, the
opinion speaks of a want of power in Congress "to amend the maritime law
so as to establish liability without fault in maritime cases regardless of par-
ticular circumstances or relations", such as, e. g., the employer-employee
relation.- ' It is difficult to see why Congress is under other or.greater limi-
tations in amending the maritime law than elsewhere in the scope of its legis-
lative activity, since it is as firmly settled as any point can be that "the
power of Congress to make such amendment is co-extensive with that law
it extends to all matters to which the maritime law extends." -13 So
far as concerns the power of Congress, it would seem that inability to impose
absolute liability in the absence of the employer-employee relation must be
derived, if at all, from the due process clause rather than from any peculiar
limitation on the power to amend the maritime law.
However, if the general tenor of the court's reasoning is not pressed to
its logical conclusion, there is a special and more limited ground connected
with the admiralty character of the proceeding on which it is possible to rest
the decision so as to sterilize its otherivise revolutionary effect. This is the
Court's holding that the review proceeding under section 2ib of the Long-
shoreman's Act is a proceeding in admiralty. 6 It follows that the judicial
power exercised in the review-proceeding is the admiralty power conferred
on the federal courts by Article III of the Constitution. The ultimate hold-
ing of the case is therefore at least susceptible of being reduced to a propo-
sition no broader than that where a federal court is exercising the admiralty
power, Congress may not constitutionally cut this power down by requiring
the court to reach conclusions of fact on a record made elsewhere. On this
view the decision would not even apply, as above suggested, to all review
proceedings in federal courts, as distinguished from state courts, but would
be limited solely to instances where the federal courts sit as courts of admi-
ralty. It is to be hoped that this construction of the holding of the case will
be ultimately established, since even should the doctrine of the case be held
inapplicable to state procedure, it would still be vastly disturbing if the
' See last three paragraphs of majority opinion.
At 294.
Ex parte Garnett, 141 W. S. . See also The Lottawanna, 21 Wall. 558 (1874) ; The
Western Maid, 257 U. S. 419, 42 Sup. Ct. i59 (1922).
-0 At 292.
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judicial power constitutionally granted to the federal courts were held to
require them on all questions of constitutional fact coming before them to
hold a trial de novo. It would, for example, inevitably undermine the effect
of the settled precedents governing review of orders of the Interstate Com-
merce Commission and would make the establishment of an effective system
of administrative regulation by the Federal government well-nigh impossible.
Furthermore, it would reach out and affect state administrative procedure
wherever the question of the constitutionality of a state administrative order
under the federal constitution was raised in a federal court, thereby requiring
the latter to decide a question of constitutional fact. There can be little
doubt, for example, that it would make unconstitutional such a statute as that
recently proposed, to do away with retrial of the facts before a federal master
in injunction suits against the enforcement of state rate orders and orders
of other state administrative bodies.77 Such results involve questions of pub-
lic policy of the gravest moment which should be faced squarely on the
merits and not foreclosed collaterally through the decision of an inconse-
quential compensation claim under the Longshoremen's Act.
I Lock-wood, Maw, and Rosenbury, The Use of the Federal Injunction in Constitutional
Litigation (I93o) 43 HARv. L. REv. 426 at 456.
